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Analytical Procedure Results as Substantive 
Evidence* 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
Christine M. Haynes 
University of  Texas at Austin 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) allow two basic types of 
evidence to satisfy  the third standard of  fieldwork.  These are analytical pro-
cedure results and tests of  details of  transactions and balances. GAAS is 
clear that the third standard can be met with any combination of  the two that 
the auditor deems to be appropriate and GAAS makes no qualitative or "com-
petency" distinction between them. Yet, analytical procedure results are rou-
tinely subject to several biases not present in tests of  details. In this paper 
we clarify  conceptual differences  that may lead to an overassessment of  the 
competency or validity of  evidence provided by analytical procedures. 
Clarification  of  the biases inherent in analytical procedures is important 
given the increased emphasis on analytical procedures in professional  stan-
dards (e.g., SAS No. 39, 47, and 56 and SAARS No. 1), and its increased use 
in practice [Tabor and Willis, 1985]. Auditors may be substituting inferior  ev-
idence for  tests of  details with an attendant increase in achieved audit risk. 
Below we review the history of  analytical procedures and their regulation, 
analyze the essential features  and risks of  analytical procedures, and demon-
strate several sources of  bias in their use as substantive evidence. Finally, 
we provide some suggestions for  research on analytical procedures and a sug-
gestion for  a change in standards. 
1. History of  Analytical Procedures in Auditing 
Essentially, analytical procedure results as substantive evidence are eval-
uations of  the reasonableness of  the assumption of  no material misstatement 
in aggregate recorded amounts, given the auditor's other knowledge. Ana-
lytical procedures do not encompass examination of  details supporting the 
validity of  particular items comprising a recorded population. Thus, the sub-
stantive validity of  any item or group of  items is not determined directly. 
The origin of  analytical procedure results as substantive evidence is un-
clear. Stringer and Stewart [1986, p. 15] cite a Deloitte Haskins & Sells audit 
*We acknowledge the helpful  comments of  Urton Anderson, Sarah Bonner, Vicky Heiman, Lisa 
Koonce, Linda McDaniel and Garry Marchant, and we wish to thank Larry Logan of  Deloitte & 
Touche for  providing a technical document. 
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manual describing the use of  analytical procedures in the 1930s and they had 
reason to believe that the manual merely codified  existing practices. Deloitte 
& Touche provided us with a copy of  Bulletin 302-1 from  the 1939 edition of 
DH&S Technical Procedures Manual. It is reproduced in Figure 1. The Bul-
letin was a revision of  the original 1935 version and was intended to elimi-
nate any confusion  about the use of  analytical procedures. While the Bulletin 
may have fallen  short of  that goal, it provided a number of  interesting points. 
For example, analytical procedures were regarded as "fundamental  and in-
dispensable" in audits involving an income statement "regardless of  the ex-
istence or absence of  internal control." Analytical procedures were intended 
as a substantive test since they were an "effort  to prove its substantial cor-
rectness as far  as is practicable without systematic audit of  the transactions." 
Finally, in contrast to current professional  standards, there is no mention of 
inquiry of  management as an important source of  an explanation for  an un-
expected material difference. 
Figure 1 
Technical Procedures Manual 
Haskins & Sells 
(1939 edition) 
Bulletin 302-1 
ANALYTIC REVIEW OF OPERATING ACCOUNTS 
This is written with a view to clearing up any misunderstanding there may be regarding the reasons 
for  and procedure of  reviewing the accounts comprehended in and culminating in the net income or loss for  a 
period, and as to when such procedure should be applied. 
In a general audit we go no farther  in systematic auditing than to test the original records, so that 
there is a considerable part of  the period that is not covered by the systematic audit of  transactions. It is 
therefore  necessary to supplement the audit tests by review of  the transactions for  the entire period. As a 
matter of  fact,  it is more logical to regard the systematic audit tests as superimposed upon the general 
analytic review than to regard the review as supplementing the audit tests. At all events, the analytic 
review of  operating accounts should be regarded as fundamental  and indispensable, in any engagement where 
the report is to include, and the certificate  to cover, a statement of  income and surplus--or any of  its 
variants--regardless of  the existence or absence of  internal control. 
The procedure in making an analytic review of  operating accounts can be outlined only generally. 
It involves subjecting each detail operating, income, profit  and loss, and surplus account to rigid scrutiny, 
and to some extent to detailed analysis, in an effort  to prove its substantial correctness as far  as practicable 
without systematic audit of  the transactions. Such review and analysis calls for  the exercise of  a high 
degree of  judgment and discrimination. The remarks to follow  should be regarded as only suggestive of  the 
general course to be followed,  subject to such amplification  and adaptation as may be necessary to meet the 
peculiar needs of  individual situations. It should be understood also that these remarks pertain only to the 
analytic review and do not purport to cover all the work to be done on the operating accounts in a general 
audit 
Each operating account (using the term in its generic sense) as it appears in the ledger or other 
record should be scrutinized in order to determine whether or not the entries have varied materially from 
month to month during the year under review, and any material variation should be investigated. In some 
cases, especially where businesses are seasonal, such monthly comparisons should be made with the 
corresponding months of  the preceding year or two. A detailed statement of  the operating accounts should 
be prepared for  the year and for  at least one preceding year (preferably  two or three) in parallel columns, and 
the respective items for  the respective years should be compared. If  there are divisions or branches of  the 
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business, the accounts for  each should be considered separately and in relation to one another. All 
significant  ratios and averages should be computed for  the purpose of  making comparisons. The ratios 
would include, for  an industrial business, the ratio of  returns, allowances, etc. to gross sales and the ratios 
to net sale of  cost of  goods sold and of  each item, or appropriate group of  items, of  selling, administrative, 
and general expenses. For certain expenses such as purchasing and receiving (if  kept separate), the ratio of 
purchases is a better standard of  comparison than the ratio to sales. Every material difference  as indicated by 
all these comparisons should be investigated to the point of  determining, as nearly as practicable, that it is 
proper or improper. The working papers should show all matters investigated and the results of  the 
investigations. 
The cost of  sales should be examined, and considered in relation to the sales, inventory, and 
accounts payable. The account for  cost of  sales, and its principal tributary accounts, such as cost of 
production, should be analyzed, as to essential features  and important amounts, so that the composi-
tion of  the accounts will be thoroughly understood. The method of  determining charges for  material, 
labor, and overhead should be critically investigated. The gross-profit  ratios for  the current and pre-
ceding periods should be computed. The inventory turnover rate should be computed, if  practicable 
as to classes of  goods (i.e., finished  product, raw materials, etc.), for  the current period and at least 
one preceding period, by dividing the cost of  goods sold or used by the average inventory. If  there is 
any indication that the cost does not bear the proper relationship to sales, or is otherwise incorrect, 
the various elements entering into the cost should be examined as exhaustively as may be necessary 
in order to determine the cause of  the difference. 
Among the other accounts which should be examined with respect to operations from  month to 
month and period to period, and with respect to their relation to other accounts, such as sales or gross 
earnings, or in some cases, assets or liabilities, specific  mention may be made of  the following: 
Sales and wages 
Income from  interest and dividends 
Interest expense 
Taxes 
Income or expense for  rents, royalties, and commissions 
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization 
Repairs and maintenance 
Direct charges and credits to surplus 
It is thought that the foregoing  explains the analytic review of  operating accounts sufficiently  so 
that the underlying purpose of  the review and the method of  procedure will be understood, as applying not 
only to the accounts that have been mentioned specifically,  but also to any other operating, income, profit 
or loss, and surplus accounts that may be encountered in practice. 
December 1935 - Revised September 1939 
We scanned the Accountant's  Index  and were unable to locate any specific 
references  to analytical review in the practice or scholarly literature prior to 
1961. Mautz and Sharaf  [1961] discuss what might be called analytical pro-
cedures including the terms "analytical and comparative review," "interrela-
tionships" and "correlations" among "related data" [Mautz and Sharaf,  1961, 
pp. 28, 86, 93, 100-101], According to Mautz, these ideas were not new but 
reflected  existing practices, at least at DH&S. Mautz was employed by DH&S 
for  a time during the 1940s and was later a consultant on an analytical review 
project [private correspondence from  Mautz, December 23, 1989]. 
The first  official  recognition of  analytical (review) procedures in profes-
sional standards appeared in November 1972 with the issuance of  Statement 
on Auditing Procedures No. 54 [AICPA, 1972]. This statement, entitled The 
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Auditor's  Study  and  Evaluation  of  Internal  Control,  established that the evi-
dential matter required by the third standard could be met through "analyt-
ical review of  significant  ratios and trends and resulting investigation of 
unusual fluctuations  and questionable items" [para. 70]. Further, "Regard-
less of  the extent of  reliance on internal accounting control, the auditor's re-
liance on substantive tests may be derived from  tests of  details, from  analytical 
review procedures, or from  any combination of  both that he considers ap-
propriate in the circumstances" [para. 73]. This official  guidance as to allowable 
proportions of  substantive evidence has remained unchanged over two major 
revisions of  analytical procedure guidance. 
SAS No. 23 [AICPA, 1978], entitled Analytical  Review Procedures,  officially 
established guidance on the identification  and investigation of  significant 
"unusual fluctuations."  It defined  analytical procedures as "substantive tests 
of  financial  information  made by a study and comparison of  relationships among 
data" [para. 2]. SAS No. 56 [AICPA, 1988], entitled simply Analytical  Proce-
dures,  provides a more precise definition  as to what constitutes analytical pro-
cedures. Specifically,  analytical procedures "consist of  evaluations of  financial 
information  made by a study of  plausible relationships among both financial 
and non-financial  data." It continues the basic premise underlying the appli-
cation of  analytical procedures stated in SAS No. 23 that: "relationships 
among data may reasonably be expected by the auditor to exist and continue 
in the absence of  known conditions to the contrary" [para. 2]. 
This basic premise is reasonable-if  a prior relation observed, under con-
ditions apparently free  from  material misstatement, continues in the audit pe-
riod, then the current values are, probably, also free  from  material misstatement 
The caveat "absence of  known conditions to the contrary" provides for  up-
dating the auditor's model but doesn't establish a standard for  how the au-
ditor is to "know" about conditions to the contrary. Must the auditor search 
for  or test for  changes in prior relations or just be aware of  known or possi-
ble changes that are more or less obvious to the casual observer? Is positive, 
rather than negative, assurance required for  assessing possible changes? 
SAS No. 56 focuses  on unexpected differences  (rather than fluctuations) 
and is explicit as to the role of  expectations. It states: 
Analytical procedures involve comparisons of  recorded amounts, 
or ratios developed from  recorded amounts, to expectations developed 
by the auditor. The auditor develops such expectations by identifying 
and using plausible relationships that are reasonably expected to exist 
based on the auditor's understanding of  the client and of  the industry 
in which the client operates [para. 5]. 
In identifying  differences  that may require analytical investigation, SAS 
No. 56 [para. 11-12] lists three factors  related to the diagnosticity of  the pro-
cedures. These are: 1) the plausibility and predictability of  the relations, 2) 
the availability and reliability of  data on which the expectations are developed, 
and 3) the precision of  the expectation. The first  suggests a causal model rather 
than merely a "casual" association while the second requires that the audi-
tor base expectations on data other than the recorded values themselves. Fi-
nally, the third makes it clear that the auditor should consider whether a 
procedure could find  an intolerably-in-error "needle" in a haystack [Kinney, 
1987; Loebbecke and Steinbart, 1987]. 
As to investigation and evaluation of  significant  differences,  SAS No. 56 
allows a range of  differences  that can be accepted without further  investiga-
tion and a range that should be investigated. In regard to investigation it states: 
The auditor should evaluate significant  unexpected differences.  Re-
considering  the methods and factors  used in developing the expecta-
tion and inquiry of  management  may assist the auditor in this regard. 
Management responses, however, should  ordinarily  be corroborated 
with other evidential matter. In those cases when an explanation for 
the difference  cannot be obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient 
evidence about the assertion by performing  other audit procedures 
to satisfy  himself  as to whether the difference  is a likely misstatement. 
In designing such other procedures, the auditor should consider that 
unexplained differences  may indicate an increased risk of  material mis-
statement [para. 21] (emphasis added). 
This paragraph, especially the highlighted terms, provides much of  the 
basis for  our concerns about the comparative competence of  analytical pro-
cedures and their tendency to understate achieved risk. We will return to it 
in the next section. 
Passage of  SAP No. 54 and SAS No. 23 was followed  by practitioner and 
scholarly discussion of  the reliability of  analytical review. For example, Mont-
gomery's  Auditing  (9th ed.) [Defliese,  Johnson, and Macleod 1975, p. 145] cham-
pioned the use of  analytical review over tests of  details under conditions of 
weak  internal control while Cushing and Loebbecke [1983] took the oppo-
site position. The latter view seems to have prevailed in that Montgomery's 
Auditing  (10th edition) [Defliese,  Jaenicke, Sullivan, and Gnospelius 1987, 
p. 341-42] discusses 100 percent reliance on analytical procedure results 
when controls are strong. 
Even though SAP No. 54, SAS No. 23 and SAS No. 56 did not indicate that 
analytical evidence was in any way inferior  to tests of  details, there was such 
an indication from  practitioners. Ernst and Whinney placed restrictions on 
the reliance that can be placed on analytical procedures [Grobstein and 
Craig, 1984, p. 14]. Montgomery's Auditing stated that analytical procedures 
produced a "subjective, deductive type of  audit evidence" rather than the "ob-
jective type of  evidence showing 'it is there or not there' which results from 
the other auditing procedures" [Defliese  et al., 1975, p. 145].1 The tenth edi-
tion of  Montgomery's Auditing stated that, relative to analytical procedures, 
tests of  details are less efficient,  but tests of  details "commonly provide a higher 
level of  assurance with respect to an audit objective" [Defliese  1987, p. 340] 
(emphasis added). Blocher and Willingham [1985] were even more explicit 
about the relative assurance. They stated: 
To evaluate the strength of  the evidence from  analytical review, 
we must consider that analytical review provides a negative-type  as-
1The same source later defines  evidence as "objective if  it requires little judgment to evaluate 
its accuracy" [Defliese  et al. 1987, p. 158]. 
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surance rather than a positive one. That is, though analytical review 
can be a useful  technique for  detecting a material misstatement, it can-
not be relied upon to confirm  with positive assurance that a mis-
statement is not present. Positive assurance comes only from  the 
proper application of  the appropriate detail tests procedures. Thus, the 
auditor can never rely exclusively on analytical review when risk or 
materiality is high [p. 10]2 (emphasis added). 
Two recent behavioral studies of  practicing auditors are consistent with 
this view. Both Biggs, et al. [1989] and Cohen and Kida [1989] found  that au-
ditors are reluctant to reduce tests of  details even when analytical procedure 
results seem to support a reduction. 
The large CPA firms  have different  histories and different  degrees of  re-
liance on analytical procedures. As mentioned above, the first  reference  to 
analytical procedures as evidence came from  DH&S. SAP No. 54 was chaired 
by Kenneth Stringer of  DH&S and his firm  was an early champion of  statis-
tical analytical procedures as substantive evidence. Stringer [1975], and 
Stringer and Stewart [1986] described a system entitled Statistical Tech-
niques for  Analytical Review in Auditing. It used time series and cross sec-
tional regression models to identify  likely-to-be-in-error segments of  an 
account or transaction class. Stringer [1975] also discussed the importance 
of  the auditor's "analytical investigation" to determine the likely cause of  a 
deviation. Some other firms  have also used regression analysis (e.g., Price 
Waterhouse, [Akresh and Wallace, 1982, and Walker and Pierce, 1988] and 
Arthur Andersen [Koster, 1981]). 
Statistical analytical procedures have had less usage in most firms,  even 
including one (Peat Marwick) that is highly structured [Wright and Ashton, 
1989, p. 722-723 and Elliott, 1984]. Also, analytical procedures of  various 
types are used for  different  purposes. For example, Ernst & Whinney uses 
different  analytical procedures for  understanding the client's business, for  in-
herent risk assessment and as substantive evidence [Grobstein and Craig, 
1984]. Finally, in contrast to the DH&S regression-based approach to ana-
lyzing an account, Montgomery's  Auditing  (Coopers & Lybrand) seems to de-
fine  the focus  of  analytical procedures to be on "ratio and trend analysis" 
[Defliese,  et al. 1987 p. 156] and is unclear about the extent to which the re-
sults provide substantive evidence. 
Thus, a variety of  analytical procedures have been used to meet various 
objectives. Because of  these differences,  we will try to be very specific  as to 
procedures and their usage in the comparative competency assessment that 
follows. 
2SAARS No. 1 [AICPA, 1978] and other AICPA-sanctioned review reports seem to provide at 
least implicit support for  this view. These reports are characterized as providing only "limited" 
assurance that is expressed in negative form.  The distinction is relevant since the review reports 
are based on only analytical procedures and inquiry of  management. 
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2. Comparative Competency of  Analytical Procedures 
vs. Tests of  Details 
For the purpose of  comparing reliability (or competency or validity) of 
tests of  details and analytical procedures results as substantive evidence, as-
sume that audit sampling is used for  tests of  details, that a single account re-
gression analysis is used to identify  differences  for  analytical procedures, and 
that both tests are for  overstatement. Figure 2 shows the aggregate audited 
account balance Y (say, sales) expressed as (1) the sum of  N error free  y's 
or sales amounts per sales invoices, and as (2) a function  of  the true relation 
between Y and an independently obtained explanatory variable X (say, industry 
sales), and a random unexplained portion, e.3 
Figure 2 
Example Upper Confidence  Limit Formulations 
Actual (error free) 
balance 
Estimated Audited 
balance 
Estimated error 
Upper Confidence  Limit: 
Analytical Procedures 1) 
Y = α + βX + e 
Y = α + βX 
E = Yb - Y 
UCL = E + ZAPR se (pred) 
Tests of  Details 
Y = Σy 
Y= Ny 
E = Y b - Y 
UCL = E + ZTDR s/√  n 
1) Y = audited balance for  the year t 
y = audited balance of  account or transaction class element in year t 
y = average y for  a random sample of  n < N items 
X = "causal" variable value for  year t 
E = error for  year t 
^ = estimated 
Yb = recorded or "book" amount 
APR = risk of  incorrect acceptance using analytical procedures 
TDR = risk of  incorrect acceptance using tests of  details 
3 Although in practice there would likely be a partitioning of  Y by plant, by product line or by 
subperiod of  time, we will use a single estimate for  simplicity. Also, for  simplicity we will assume 
that simple random sampling is used and that a single causal variable X is considered in the au-
ditor's model. 
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Figure 2 also shows the estimate of  Y (Y)given audited values of  a ran-
domly selected sample of  n items and an independent estimate of  Y given X 
and the auditor's estimates of  a and β. Again, for  the purpose of  comparison, 
imagine a case in which the two techniques yield the same point estimate of 
error and that the standard error of  the estimate in tests of  details (s/√n) is 
equal to the standard error of  the regression prediction (se(pred)). Thus, the 
two procedures yield the same upper confidence  level (UCL) on error. If  the 
UCL is just under the minimum intolerable error (MIE), which procedure 
do you think yields more reliable or more competent evidence? 
Figures 3 (tests of  details) and 4 (analytical procedures) show that each 
of  the procedures has two general failure  points; that is, points at which the 
auditor can be led incorrectly to accept a balance that is "intolerably" in 
error. For tests of  details (audit sampling), the points are: (1) the selection 
of  a sample which has smaller book values and/or contains proportionately 
less error than what exists in the population as a whole (sampling error), and 
(2) error in selecting or applying the auditing procedure such as selections 
from  recorded amounts to test the completeness assertion or failing  to note 
an error in a sampled item (non-sampling error). The first  risk can be mea-
sured within the limits of  sampling error, and auditing standards assume that 
the second can be made negligible by quality control procedures [SAS No. 
39, para. 11 and SAS No. 47, para. 20]. 
For analytical procedures, the two points of  potential failure  are (1) the 
identification,  estimation and refinement  of  the expectations model, and (2) 
the analytical investigation of  differences  from  the resulting expectations. For 
the first,  the auditor may incorrectly specify  the causal relations between in-
dependent variables and the account under audit, may misestimate the co-
efficients  or the allowable range of  deviation, or may fail  to note changes in 
the relations or may incorrectly revise the model based on management's sug-
gested explanation. For the second, the auditor may incorrectly accept a non-
error explanation and revise the expectation sufficiently  to yield UCL < MIE 
when the account is intolerably overstated. Figure 5 presents a numerical ex-
ample of  how the second step can inflate  the achieved audit risk. The first 
stage is based on achieving a risk of  incorrect acceptance of  .05. In the ex-
ample, the second stage adds .15 to that amount for  an achieved audit risk 
of  .20 over a number of  audits (see Kinney, [1989] for  an elaboration of  the 
need for  sequential analysis in auditing). 
In the paragraphs to follow,  we discuss a series of  potential and likely bi-
ases that lead us to conclude that the application of  analytical procedures is 
likely to understate the risk of  incorrect acceptance. The basic causes of  the 
biases are both statistical and behavioral, and are, in part, induced by pro-
fessional  standards themselves. 
A fundamental  competency advantage of  tests of  details is that for  sam-
pled items (and absent non-sampling error), misstatement is ruled out or con-
versely, "correctness" or validity of  each recorded y is positively  established. 
The test can lead to incorrect acceptance only through sampling variation or 
sampling error. For analytical procedures, the correctness of  an item or 
group of  items is not positively established, by definition.  Thus, a second in-
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Figure 3 
Risks of  Failure Using Test of  Details 
Procedure Risk 
Sampling error 
Nonsampling error 
Incorrect acceptance 
Incorrect rejection 
1) MIE = minimum intolerable error for  the assertions being tested for  overstatement 
A = accept recorded value as not intolerably overstated. 
R = reject recorded values as possibly intolerably overstated. 
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Randomly select 
sample n items 
Audit n items 
selected 
and estimate 
UCL 
UCL ≤ MIE 
? 
Y 
N 
A 
R 
1) 
Figure 4 
Risks of Failure Using Analytical Procedures 
Procedure Risk 
N 
Model 
identification / 
estimation error 
Incorrect acceptance 
Incorrect/incomplete 
explanation 
Incorrect rejection 
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Identify (refine) 
model and 
estimate UCL 
UCL ≤ MIE 
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ference  is always required for  analytical procedures. Specifically,  if  the un-
explained differences  are small, then intolerable error in the overall account 
balance is inferred  to be negligible. 
Statistical Biases 
At the model identification,  estimation and refinement  stage, the auditor 
is developing a basis for  expected audited values. The auditor faces  several 
risks that increase the variance of  outcomes and some that bias results to-
ward incorrect acceptance. They relate to the model used and the data to which 
it is applied. Many of  these difficulties  are well known. 
First, the auditor may fail  to include variables that are causal. This risk 
can be reduced by auditor expertise in the client's industry. The auditor may 
also include Xs that are not causally related to Y. Here, the risk is over-iden-
tifying  the model or including variables that are spuriously correlated with 
Y in the base period but are uncorrelated in the prediction period. Thus, vari-
ables which by chance have high correlation in the base period are inap-
propriately included for  the prediction period. Finally, the auditor may fail  to 
notice that the parameters of  included variables have changed between the 
base and the prediction periods. 
While these phenomena may lead to incorrect acceptance, they may also 
lead to incorrect rejection. There is no reason to expect a statistical bias. How-
ever, as described in the next subsection, the analytical investigation stage 
of  the process can lead to a model building bias toward incorrect acceptance. 
Specifically,  the identification  of  an unexpected difference  can lead the au-
ditor to search in a biased  fashion  for  omitted non-error causal variables. That 
is, the auditor's search for  omitted variables is caused by the identification 
of  an unacceptable difference  (UCL ≥ MIE) and the ensuing search for  an 
explanation naturally leads to a higher probability of  including a non-error  cause 
that reduces the UCL. For example, suppose that the audit year cost of  sales 
contains an unexpected increase in labor costs of  $10, an unexpected decrease 
in materials cost of  $10 and an inventory counting error of  $10 that under-
states the expense. As a result, cost of  sales is $10 less than expected and 
the auditor searching for  an explanation would be more likely to detect the 
decrease in materials cost than to detect the increase in labor cost or the ac-
counting error.4 Thus, the biased search for  an omitted causal explanation 
can lead to failure  to detect misstatements. 
Second, erroneous or irrelevant data also have both positive and nega-
tive aspects with respect to incorrect acceptance of  accounts with intolera-
ble total error. Bad data in the base period may prevent reliance on statistical 
analytical procedures. For example, random measurement error in the X vari-
able for  the base period will lead to estimates of  β biased toward zero, and 
an inflation  of  the standard error of  the regression (se) will cause the audi-
tor not to rely on regression since the UCL will tend to be high. Thus, ran-
4SAS No. 56 [para. 18] warns that "offsetting  factors  may obscure misstatements," e.g., an un-
expected nonerror understatement could hide an error-caused overstatement Yet the auditor 
trying to explain a UCL ≥ MIE would have no reason to look for  a non-error factor  that would 
increase the UCL! 
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dom measurement error in the base period X values leads to an incorrect 
rejection or efficiency  bias. Nonrandom measurement error leads to less pre-
dictable results. However, since the base period has been audited, there is 
reduced risk of  bad data in the base period. The potential problem of  inten-
tionally misstated X data for  the prediction period is one reason that Cush-
ing and Loebbecke [1983] argued for  strong internal controls as a requisite 
for  reliance on analytical tests. 
We have labeled this subsection "statistical" biases. However, the risks 
and biases apply to a non-statistically-based procedure as well as to statisti-
cally-based procedures. Subjectively or judgmentally failing  to consider an 
important causal variable can bias one's judgment about the results to be ex-
pected. Also, a lack of  quantification  of  estimates may lead to unrealistic as-
sessments of  effects  and to systematic underestimates of  the normal variation 
in expected values [Tversky and Kahneman, 1971]. The latter behavioral ten-
dency will cause the UCL to be too low and lead to increased risk of  incor-
rect acceptance. This inability to signal or "flag"  intolerable (or even material) 
misstatements seems to be especially probable when considering ratios 
based on aggregate values.5 
Behavioral Biases 
At the stage of  evaluating analytical procedure results, SAS No. 56 sug-
gests several practices that are almost sure to lead to an increase in the risk 
of  incorrect acceptance. For accounts for  which the UCL equals or exceeds 
MIE, paragraph 21 of  SAS No. 56 (reproduced earlier) provides guidance for 
follow-up.  Specifically,  it lists five  ways in which the process is biased toward 
incorrect acceptance when an unexpected difference  is noted. Rather than 
considering possible misstatement, the first  suggestion in paragraph 21 is that 
A 
the auditor "reconsider" the model used to develop the expectation (Y) and, 
second, it indicates that "inquiry of  management" may assist in this regard 
(is management likely to suggest fraud  or error as the cause?). Third, as to 
corroborating management's suggested explanations, paragraph 21 states that 
they "should ordinarily be" corroborated (but not always?). Fourth, appar-
ently only in those cases in which "an explanation for  the difference  cannot 
be obtained" the auditor should apply other procedures to rule out mis-
statement. Finally, in designing other procedures, the auditor should consider 
that "unexplained differences  may indicate an increased risk of  material mis-
statement." It seems clear that the risk of  such misstatement is increased if, 
indeed, no non-misstatement explanation can be found  for  the difference.  That 
is, if  all other factors  have been ruled out, then all that is left  is chance or mis-
statement. Thus, paragraph 21 of  SAS No. 56 focuses  attention on non-error 
causes that may bias the auditor toward incorrect acceptance. 
In addition to the possible bias due to the official  guidance, the psychol-
ogy literature has identified  several biases that decision makers often  exhibit 
when making probabilistic judgments. Auditing is characterized by complex 
probabilistic judgments and much of  behavioral auditing research has focused 
5For further  caveats about the problem of  weak diagnosticity, see Grobstein and Craig [1984, 
p. 14], Loebbecke and Steinbart [1987] and Kinney [1987]. 
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on auditors' biases in making such judgments. The research discussed below 
is a sample of  the studies indicating possible behavioral biases that may re-
sult in an understatement of  achieved audit risk through the application of 
analytical procedures as substantive tests. The biases are grouped accord-
ing to whether they apply during the audit in determining a possible expla-
nation of  an unexpected difference  (hypothesis generation), or in revising 
assessed probabilities of  possible causes, or after  the audit is completed and 
results are evaluated by others. 
Hypothesis Generation 
The availability bias refers  to the tendency of  a decision maker to judge 
the frequency  of  an event by the ease with which similar events come to mind 
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1973]. Events may be salient because they are 
sensational or vivid or because they have been experienced frequently.  Libby 
[1985] asked auditors to hypothesize up to six errors that might explain un-
usual analytical review results and to rate the likelihood that each error 
caused the fluctuation.  Results indicated that the likelihood of  each error was 
affected  by its perceived frequency,  its actual frequency  and the recency with 
which the error had been encountered by the auditors. These results for  error 
causes are disturbing if  analytical review is to be used as substantive evidence. 
We know of  no archival data on non-error explanations of  unexpected dif-
ferences.  However, if  the auditor has frequently  or recently encountered 
non-error  causes when evaluating significant  fluctuations  in other clients' fi-
nancial statements, he or she may be too easily persuaded that a currently 
observed fluctuation  is also due to a non-error  cause. As a result, achieved 
audit risk may be understated. 
Output interference  occurs when knowledge already retrieved from  mem-
ory hinders the retrieval of  additional items (see Nickerson [1984]). Fred-
erick [1988] found  experienced auditors to be affected  by output interference. 
Auditors studied lists of  internal controls and then were asked to recall the 
controls. Half  of  the auditors were presented with a partial list of  previously 
learned internal controls; the other half  received no cues. Auditors without 
the cues recalled more controls on the recall task than did those provided 
with the partial list. 
Output interference  may cause auditors to misdiagnose significant  fluc-
tuations in analytical review results. If  the auditor asks client management 
to explain a deviation, the non-error reasons provided may interfere  with re-
trieval of  the auditor's own knowledge of  possible error causes. If  the audi-
tor relies on his or her own experience, output interference  combined with 
the availability heuristic may cause the auditor to focus  on the causes most 
accessible in memory to the exclusion of  an important error cause.6 
Heiman [1990] studied auditors' spontaneous generation of  explanations 
for  unexpected differences.  She found  that auditors did not spontaneously 
generate as many alternative explanations for  ratio fluctuations  as they did 
6Hock [1984] and Moser [1989] link output interference  with availability to provide a mecha-
nism by which judgments are biased. 
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when prompted to do so. Failure to generate or consider counter-explanations, 
together with belief  perseverance (see next subsection) may cause the au-
ditor to accept a non-error cause of  analytical review deviations despite evi-
dence to the contrary. If  auditors receive from  management a non-error cause 
for  an unexpected difference  and don't spontaneously generate possible 
error causes, the chances of  incorrect acceptance are increased. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic represents the decision maker's 
tendency to focus  on an initial value (an anchor) and to subsequently update 
(adjust) inadequately the initial belief  as new information  is received. Behavioral 
research has shown that anchoring and adjustment can result in a judg-
mental bias since decision makers may rely on an irrelevant initial anchor, 
or may make insufficient  adjustments with respect to the informativeness  of 
the new data [Libby, 1981, pp. 162-163]. Kinney and Uecker [1982] reported 
results consistent with anchoring in an attention directing analytical review 
task. Auditors tended to anchor on book value to develop point estimates be-
yond which an analytical investigation of  the book value was appropriate. Biggs 
and Wild [1985], and Heintz and White [1989] obtained similar results in ex-
tensions. This bias applies only to non-statistical procedures but is disturb-
ing since it violates independence of  expectations and book values. 
Probability Revision 
Revision of  initially formed  probability or risk assessments may also be 
biased. In some situations, decision makers may continue belief  in an initial 
hypothesis even in light of  subsequently received evidence to the contrary. 
That is, the initial belief  "perseveres." Koonce [1990] investigated auditors' 
tendency to focus  on initial beliefs  in an analytical review setting and found 
results consistent with belief  perseverance. Specifically,  Koonce's results in-
dicated that auditors who developed written non-error explanations for  un-
usual analytical review results continued to accept the explanation as the most 
likely unless explicitly requested to develop counter-explanations. 
After  forming  an initial hypothesis in a judgment task, decision makers 
often  search for  and place more importance on evidence that confirms  the 
hypothesis than on disconfirming  evidence [Fischhoff  and Beyth-Marom, 1983; 
Klayman and Ha, 1987]. This "confirmation  bias" is found  in a variety of  set-
tings including complex problem-solving and probabilistic-judgment tasks sim-
ilar to those found  in auditing (e.g., Wason [1960], Wason and Johnson-Laird 
[1972] and Snyder and Swann [1978]). When auditing a reputable client, the 
auditor may have a strong initial belief  that no material misstatements are 
present in the financial  statements. Mautz and Sharaf  [1961, p. 28] indicate 
that the idea of  an initial hypothesis of  no error is one of  long standing. If  er-
rors or irregularities do exist, however, a confirmation  bias may influence  the 
auditor's assessment of  subsequent evidence and counter-evidence and 
achieved audit risk may be higher than planned. 
While confirmation  bias is potentially important in evaluating analytical 
procedure results, behavioral research in auditing has found  only mixed sup-
port for  it. When evaluating a going-concern issue, Kida [1984] found  that, 
in general, auditors place more importance on the factors  indicating possi-
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ble failure  than on the factors  indicating viability. Trotman and Sng [1989] 
extended Kida [1984] with essentially the same results in an internal control 
task. Ashton and Ashton [1988] found  that auditors were influenced  more 
by disconfirming  evidence than by confirming  evidence in an internal con-
trol task. Butt and Campbell [1989] also tested for  confirmation  bias in an in-
ternal control task and found  that auditors did not seek confirming  evidence 
unless specifically  requested to do so. In a study of  analytical procedures, the 
Biggs, Mock, and Watkins [1989] protocol analyses of  four  audit managers 
and seniors in an analytical review task suggested that, while the two man-
agers were careful  to guard against confirmation  bias, the two audit seniors 
were less likely to do so. The authors concluded that experience might af-
fect  the auditor's ability to appropriately analyze analytical review results. How-
ever, Bonner's [1990] results indicate that experience differences  play an 
important role in analytical review cue selection and weighting but are not 
important in evaluating internal control risk. This suggests that task-specific 
knowledge may mitigate confirmation  bias. 
According to Bayes' rule, the order in which information  is presented should 
not affect  the decision maker's belief  revision process. However, the psy-
chological literature has documented situations in which the order of  evidence 
presentation affects  revised beliefs.  Hogarth and Einhorn [1989] have de-
veloped a belief-adjustment  model that can explain primacy, recency or no 
order effects  depending on complexity, length of  the evidence series, and re-
sponse mode. Ashton and Ashton [1988] used the Hogarth and Einhorn 
[1989] model and successfully  predicted recency effects  in auditors' internal 
control evaluations. Butt and Campbell [1989] also found  support for  the be-
lief-adjustment  model when auditors held weak initial beliefs  about internal 
control reliability. With the exception of  Koonce [1990], we are not aware of 
any studies of  possible order effects  in use of  analytical procedures. However, 
order may be important, especially in light of  the fact  that the auditor may 
stop the investigation before  contrary evidence is received or may resist con-
sideration of  subsequently received evidence to the contrary. 
Post Audit Analysis 
Decisions should be evaluated in light of  the information  available at the 
time the decision was made regardless of  the ultimate outcome. Hindsight 
bias refers  to the inability to evaluate past decisions without considering cur-
rently available information  [Fischhoff,  1975]. While hindsight bias has not 
been studied in an auditing context [Ashton et al., 1988], the bias is particu-
larly detrimental if  analytical review procedures are used as substantive ev-
idence since decisions are based on limited, aggregated information.  If,  after 
the auditor's report is issued, subsequent information  reveals material mis-
statement and the auditor's work is challenged, the courts may determine 
that the auditor should have recognized the potential for  misstatement using 
properly applied analytical procedures. The auditor should consider the po-
tential effects  of  hindsight bias before  choosing to rely on analytical proce-
dures as substantive evidence. That is, ask, "How will others judge the 
credibility of  my evidence if,  indeed, material misstatement exists?" Thus, in 
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addition to consideration of  his or her own biases, the auditor may need to 
consider biases of  others who will have additional information. 7 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In the paragraphs above, we have outlined the history and several potential 
limitations of  the reliability of  analytical procedure results used as substan-
tive evidence. In contrast to substantive tests of  details, we find  that analyti-
cal procedure results are subject to several biases that may overstate their 
apparent competence. 
With proper selection and application of  audit procedures, tests of  details 
will fail  to detect extant intolerable error only if  the auditor is unlucky—that 
is, only if  the sample is not representative of  the population. For analytical 
procedures, the auditor may fail  due to chance fluctuations  in the data. How-
ever, analytical procedures may also fail  to detect error due to biases related 
to the way in which auditor's research question is posed—trying to determine 
that the recorded data might be right  rather than trying to see whether it is 
wrong. 
What, if  anything, can be or should be done? We have some suggestions 
for  researchers and for  standards setters. 
Researchers 
There are several promising areas for  further  research into the reliabil-
ity or competency of  analytical procedures. There is need for  analytical work 
as well as for  statistical and behavioral studies. Our list is based on the 
thoughts expressed above and should not be interpreted as comprehensive 
for  the entire area of  analytical procedures. 
From an analytical perspective, what is the essential mathematical nature 
of  analytical procedures with respect to error and how they should be com-
bined in revising prior probabilities of  error? Is Bayes' Rule adequate? How 
does the second inference  required for  analytical procedures affect  probability 
revision? How should the second order probability by accommodated?8 
How reliable are the analytical procedures used in practice? How does 
their reliability differ  across procedures or across accounts or across levels 
of  expertise? What is their achieved risk? Statements that X percent of  all er-
rors detected by auditors were detected by analytical procedures (e.g., see 
Wright and Ashton [1989]), are one sided. The statement is not reversible 
into a positive statement that absence of  an indication of  misstatement means 
an absence of  material error—the auditor may have been a victim of  bias or 
simply may not have looked hard enough. 
On the behavioral side, to what extent do the biases discussed above apply 
and how much do they affect  achieved reliability of  analytical procedures? 
Are auditors unduly influenced  by management's suggestions of  non-mis-
7Felix and Waller [1984] refer  to the probability of  evidence being judged adequate as a "sec-
ond order" probability. 
8 See footnote  7. 
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statement explanations of  unexpected differences?  Or, do auditors system-
atically discount the results of  analytical procedures as Biggs, et al. [1989] 
and Cohen and Kida [1989] suggest? Is the discounting a recognition of  some 
of  the inherent limitations of  analytic procedure results as evidence? 
Standards Setters 
As indicated above, SAS No. 56 is a considerable improvement in guid-
ance to practitioners. It provides at least a partial conceptual basis for  ana-
lytical procedures and many warnings of  dangers in the application of  analytical 
procedures. However, there is one rather simple modification  to its guidance 
that could lead to substantive reduction in the biases discussed above. 
The suggestion is to change the focus  of  SAS No. 56 paragraph 21 from 
a search for  non-misstatement  causes to a consideration of  misstatement 
causes. Figure 6 presents possible wording. The suggestion is similar to the 
"conceptually logical approach" of  SAP No. 54 [para. 65] to "consider the types 
of  errors and irregularities that could occur" and then to consider which con-
trols would prevent them. For analytical procedures, the approach would be 
to consider possible misstatements and then look for  data that would be con-
sistent with the misstatement. 
Figure 6 
Suggested Revision to SAS No. 561 
.21 The auditor should evaluate significant  unexpected differences  and 
evaluate possible misstatements as the cause. For example, an 
unusual difference  between recorded and expected cost of  sales 
might be due to omitted credit purchases or a pricing error in 
the ending inventory. Consideration of  related payables and 
inventory balances may help resolve the matter. After 
considering possible misstatement, inquiry of  management may assist 
the auditor in revising the auditor's expectation. Management 
responses, however, should ordinarily be corroborated with other 
evidential matter. 
.21a In those cases when an explanation for  the difference  cannot be 
obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient  evidence about the assertion 
by performing  other audit procedures to satisfy  himself  as to whether the 
difference  is a likely misstatement.3 In deciding such other procedures, the 
auditor should consider that unexplained differences  may indicate an 
increased risk of  material misstatement. 
1 Additions are in bold and deletions in the original are lined. 
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Given an unexpected difference,  the auditor would consider what error 
cause might explain it. Then the auditor would consider what other readily 
available data would be consistent with the error and determine whether the 
other data is consistent. For example, when recorded cost of  sales is unex-
pectedly low, the auditor might hypothesize that it could be due to omitted 
credit purchases and then look to see whether ending payables are also 
lower than expected. Alternatively, he or she might consider possible over-
pricing of  the ending inventory and look for  unexpectedly high ending in-
ventory. Note that if  the auditor simply asks management (as SAS No. 56 
discusses), management might suggest improved inventory planning and con-
trol or improved purchasing procedures as the explanation. The auditor 
might search for  and find  some evidence of  such improvements and incor-
rectly attribute too large a dollar effect  to the improvement and stop his or 
her search for  error. 
It seems to us that auditing standards should be designed to help reduce 
biases to which the auditor may fall  victim—especially those that lead to in-
correct acceptance. We believe that a change in the focus  of  paragraph 21 of 
SAS No. 56 could help. 
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